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Abstract 
Internet of medical things (IoMT) is an emerging technology aiming to improve 
the patient's quality of life by enabling personalized e‐health services without 
limitations on time and location. Nevertheless, IoMT devices (eg, medical sensors) 
that constitute the key underlying elements of the IoMT edge network are 
vulnerable to various types of security threats and thus, they pose a significant risk 
to patient's privacy and safety. Based on that and the fact that the security is a 
critical factor for the successful integration of IoMT technology into pervasive 
healthcare systems, there is an urgent need for novel security mechanisms to 
preserve the security of the IoMT edge network. Toward this direction, the first 
step is the comprehensive understanding of existing and potential threats to the 
IoMT edge network environment. Thus, in this article, we provide a categorization 
of security threats to the edge network environment based on the major security 
objectives that they target. Moreover, we present a categorization of security 
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countermeasures, derived from the literature, against threats to IoMT edge 
networks. The authors' intent is to provide a foundation for organizing research 
efforts toward the development of proper security countermeasures for protecting 
IoMT edge networks against internal and external threats. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, where time and space cease to have limits thanks to new technologies, 
services are on the same path. One of the areas considered to be pioneer in 
adopting technologies to provide real‐time and ubiquitous services is the healthcare 
sector. Under the umbrella of Internet of things (IoT) a wide range of entities, 
including people, machines, and things are interconnected into information space 
in anywhere at any time.1, 2 The evolution and rise of IoT are transforming the 
healthcare industry and introduce the Internet of medical things (IoMT), where 
medical devices are interconnected in a global network that anyone, anywhere, and 
anytime may have access to3. 
The landscape of e‐health IoMT‐based applications has taken a remarkable lead in 
terms of wellness services motivating millions of people around the world to 
achieve a healthier lifestyle. In this context, healthcare services have transformed 
into user‐centric, precise, ubiquitous, and personalized services such as a private 
healthcare provider round the clock.4-6 However, in order to achieve the maximum 
possible outcome from these healthcare applications over IoMT, certain 
challenges, which are just around the corner, need serious attention so as to be 
addressed.7-9 In particular, IoMT devices (eg, medical wearable and implantable 
sensors) that constitute the key underlying elements of the IoMT edge network are 
vulnerable to various types of security threats and thus, they pose a significant risk 
to patient's privacy and safety. For example, adversaries can hack into IoMT 
devices themselves and modify the stored data or manipulate device's functionality. 
Based on that and the fact that security is a critical factor highly dependent on the 
reliability of the involved medical devices, for the successful deployment of IoMT 
technology into pervasive healthcare systems, there is an urgent need for novel 
security mechanisms to preserve the security of the IoMT edge network. To this 
end, the first step is the comprehensive understanding and proper categorization of 
existing and potential threats to the IoMT edge network environment. As IoMT 
devices have capabilities and technical characteristics similar to those of IoT 
devices, existing attacks against IoT networks can also be considered as potential 
threats to the IoMT edge network.10 Therefore, the authors pursued an extensive 
research on the existing and potential security threats to the IoMT edge network 
environment and provide a categorization based on the major security objectives 
that these threats target. Moreover, the authors present a categorization of security 




Following the Introduction, the rest of the article is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, a system architecture of IoMT‐enabled healthcare systems is presented 
along with the definition of the IoMT edge network. The major security objectives 
in IoMT edge network are described in Section 3, while a detailed description of 
the generalized attack types in IoMT edge network is discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5presents a categorization of the security threats that have already been 
realized or can be potentially launched against IoMT edge network based on the 
major security objectives that they target. In Section 6, a categorization of security 
countermeasures addressing these threats, derived from the literature, is provided. 
Finally, the survey article is concluded in Section 7. 
2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OF IoMT‐ENABLED 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
IoMT is basically an IoT‐based solution that enables the development of IoT‐
enabled healthcare systems for monitoring a variety of different kinds of vital signs 
such as ECG, heart rate, and blood pressure.3 The key aspect in IoMT‐enabled 
healthcare systems is to improve patients' quality of life by mitigating a possible 
unpleasant hospitalization.11 Giving the patients the opportunity to walk around the 
medical and nonmedical environments and guaranteeing the continuously 
monitoring of their vital signs and health status, without any interruption, is a 
fundamental feature for high quality provision of medical services.12-14 
The main component of an IoMT‐based healthcare system is the IoMT edge 
network, as shown in Figure 1, consisting of a rich set of IoMT‐enabled devices 
that enable the individuals to track their physical wellness and monitor their health 
status digitally.15, 16 For instance, the individuals may monitor their health data any 
time, from any computer or mobile device. IoMT‐enabled devices can vary from 
smart watches or smart shoes to a wide range of sensors such as ECG sensors, 
EEG sensors, airflow sensors, blood pressure sensors, motion sensors, and activity 
sensors as shown in Figure 1.3, 12 It is noteworthy to mention that IoMT‐enabled 
sensors have ubiquitous and pervasive identification, sensing, and communication 
capabilities so that vital signs can be captured from any place (eg, home, hospital, 
office).12 Moreover, the IoMT edge network includes the user's terminal device 
(eg, smartphone) that plays the role of the smart e‐health gateway. This gateway is 
responsible for receiving and forwarding the received vital sign data, based on the 
network availability, to either: (i) a cellular base station, through a long‐range 
wireless technology (eg, 4G/5G), or (ii) a router, through short coverage 
communication protocols, such as Bluetooth and 6LoWPAN, or Wi‐Fi, so that the 
vital sign data will reach, over the Internet, the Cloud platform services at the 
healthcare provider side for further data processing and storage.3, 12 The collected 
health data may represent a source of big data for statistical and epidemiological 
research. The cloud services are accessible by the patients from anywhere and at 
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any time. At the same time, authorized healthcare professionals may access these 
services in order to provide medical diagnosis and treatment to the patients. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Open in figure viewerPowerPoint 
System architecture of IoMT‐enabled healthcare systems. 
3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN IoMT EDGE 
NETWORK 
In the context of the IoMT edge network, the following six major security 
objectives have been identified: 
3.1 Confidentiality 
Assures that confidential information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized entities.17 In the context of the IoMT edge network, confidentiality 
refers to the protection of patient's medical information, shared with a therapist, a 
physician or medical staff, from being disclosed to unauthorized third parties that 
can harm the patient or use this medical information in an inappropriate 
manner.18 For example, if confidentiality of the transmitted data is not preserved, 
an adversary could interfere between the sender (eg, medical IoT device) and the 
receiver (eg, smartphone‐gateway) in order to intercept the transmitted medical 
data and access unauthorized information. There is a wide range of approaches to 
ensure confidentiality ranging from physical protection to cryptographic 
algorithms which unintelligibly render data.17 
3.2 Integrity 
Assures that data have not been destroyed or altered in an unauthorized 
manner.17 Applied to IoMT edge network, integrity preserves the accuracy of 
patient related information such as personal medical data, health summary, clinical 
notes, and test results.17 In particular, the integration of the emerging IoT 
technology in the healthcare sector has been increasing the reliance upon 
networked data, and, more than ever, healthcare organizations realize the 
importance of data integrity. Apart from data integrity, in the context of the IoMT 
edge network, the concepts of device and software integrity have drawn attention 
as well. The successful acceptance of IoMT edge networks in healthcare sector is 
also highly dependent on the integrity of the involved devices such as wearable or 
implantable sensors.19 However, due to the fact that IoMT devices usually operate 
in trustless environments, they are subject to physical attacks that target device 
integrity.20 Besides, the integrity of the running software (eg, operating systems, 
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applications) on the medical devices is also a key element for ensuring security in 
the IoMT edge network.20 
3.3 Non‐repudiation 
Prevents an entity from denying previous commitments or actions in an 
interaction.17 For instance, data extracted from the sensors of one patient may send 
and later the patient deny such data belong to him. Or, an authorized developer 
updates the firmware in few sensors and afterward deny its validity. When disputes 
arise due to an entity denying previous commitments or certain actions that were 
authorized, there is a need for a means to resolve the situation. In many cases, a 
specific procedure involving a trusted third party is needed to resolve such 
disputes.17 
3.4 Authentication 
Applies to both entities (ie, entity authentication) and transmitted information (ie, 
message authentication).17 Entity authentication or identification is the process by 
which one communicating entity is assured of the claimed identity of another 
entity involved in the interaction, and that the latter has actually participated. On 
the other hand, message authentication is the process by which an entity is verified 
as the original source of given data generated at some time in the 
past.17 Nowadays, there is a trend toward lightweight authentication protocols as 
many IoT devices do not provide enough memory and CPU power to execute the 
cryptographic operations required for traditional authentication protocols.21 
3.5 Authorization 
Is the conveyance, to another entity, of official permission to do or be 
something.17 In other words, authorization ensures that only entitled entities can 
obtain access to certain network services or resources, such as a medical IoT 
device or collected medical data of a patient. For instance, only trusted expertise 
parties are granted permission to perform a given action such as issuing commands 
to medical IoT devices, or updating the medical IoT device software.21 Access 
control is a common security technique that ensures authorization. 
3.6 Availability 
Ensures that systems work properly and services are not denied to authorized 
users.22 Therefore, medical data are always accessible and useable upon demand by 
a legitimate entity. In the context of IoMT edge network, it is of major importance 
to ensure the availability of device and network resources when a patient needs 
care services without disruptions.23, 24 
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4 GENERALIZED ATTACK TYPES IN IoMT EDGE 
NETWORK 
The increasing number of resource‐constrained medical devices connected to 
IoMT‐based networks over wireless networks leads to security breaches by 
malicious actors who exploit possible system vulnerabilities in order to launch 
attacks and gain access to confidential information or affect extracted results and 
device operations.25, 26 This section presents a brief description of generalized types 
of attacks that can be potential attacks against IoMT edge networks. 
4.1 Eavesdropping attacks 
An attack which takes advantage of unsecured network communications to 
interfere between the communication of two entities, such as smartphones or 
sensor nodes, without their consent. The attacker secretly listens to the 
communication to capture useful information, so afterward the attacker can use this 
information to masquerade as the claimant. Eavesdropping attacks are difficult to 
detect because they do not cause abnormalities to the network transmission 
operations.27 
4.2 Spoofing attacks 
The deliberate prompting of an entity or resource to act in an incorrect way. For 
instance, the attacker may fake the sending address of the transmission data in 
order to illegally enter into a secure system. Piggybacking and mimicking are 
being considered as types of spoofing.27 
4.3 Traffic analysis attacks 
A form of passive attack in which an intruder gains knowledge of the transmitted 
information by inference from observable characteristics of a data flow. The 
information may not be directly available, for instance, when the data are 
encrypted. These characteristics may include the identities and locations of the 
involved entities (ie, sources and destinations) of the data flow, and also the flow's 
presence, absence, amount, direction, frequency, and duration of occurrence.27 
4.4 Masquerading attacks 
A type of active attack whereby unauthorized entities illegitimately pose as 
authorized entities to gain greater privilege to a system than what they are 
authorized for. Moreover, the attacker may perform a malicious action by 
illegitimately posing as an authorized entity.27 For instance, the attacker may steal 
the user's terminal device (eg, user's smartphone) login credentials and gain 
unauthorized privileges to access stored confidential health data by masquerading 
the legitimate user.20 
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4.5 Physical attacks 
Physical attacks are concentrated on the physical layer, and so on the devices 
themselves.28-30 For instance, adversary changes the behavior or structure of 
devices involved in IoMT edge network by leading the system to hardware 
failure.22 Examples of physical attacks include device capture, tampering, invasive 
hardware attacks, side‐channel attacks, and reverse engineering attacks.20 
4.6 Malware attacks 
An attacker designs and operates malicious software or firmware in order to violate 
the security of a system. This software or firmware is often covertly inserted into 
another program and intents to destroy data, run destructive or intrusive programs, 
or otherwise compromise the privacy, accuracy, or reliability of the system's data, 
applications, or the entire operating system. Common means for malware attacks 
include worms, virus programs, malicious mobile code, trojan horses, rootkits, or 
other code‐based malicious entity that successfully infects a system.27, 31 
4.7 Man‐in‐the‐middle attacks 
This kind of active attack takes place when a malicious actor interferes in the 
communication between two authenticated entities (eg, the claimant and verifier of 
the authentication protocol), intercepting, compromising, or even concealing 
messages exchanged to each other. The attacker may selectively alter the 
communicated data to masquerade as one or more of the legitimate entities 
involved.32 
4.8 Denial‐of‐service attacks 
A type of attack aiming at the obstruction of provisioning time‐critical functions or 
the restriction of accessing authorized assets and facilities.33, 34 Time‐critical may 
be milliseconds or it may be hours, depending upon the service provided. This 
could be achieved by flooding the resource constrained IoMT edge network with a 
great number of requests, causing bandwidth congestion.35, 36 
4.9 Battery drainage attacks 
Battery drainage attack occurs when an adversary exploits the resource constraints 
of a device (ie, mostly a wearable or an implantable one) in order to drain its 
battery and make it unavailable for the legitimate user.37, 38 For example, the 
attacker may overrun the IoMT device with a large number of no authorized 
requests thus preventing it from going to sleep or energy saving mode.20 
4.10 Impersonation attacks 
10 
 
Another type of attack is impersonation where a malicious actor pretends to be a 
legitimate entity (eg, Claimant or Verifier) in an authentication protocol in order to 
gain access to resources to which they are not authorized for Reference 39. In the 
scenario where the attacker impersonates the Verifier in an authentication protocol, 
he/she usually aims to capture information about the Claimant that can be used to 
impersonate as a Claimant to the real Verifier.27 
4.11 Message fabrication/modification/replay attacks 
Finally, in message fabrication/modification and replay attacks the adversary is 
able to construct, change, or resend, respectively, already transmitted messages 
between legitimate entities with the intent of producing an unauthorized effect or 
gaining unauthorized access.40 
5 SECURITY THREATS IN IoMT EDGE NETWORK 
In IoMT edge network environment, where the transmitted, processed, and stored 
data are sensitive, the concerns about security and privacy are 
increased.41 Therefore, at this section, the authors provide a categorization of the 
security threats, as shown in Figure 2 targeting the IoMT edge network based on 
the security objectives that they intend to compromise. 
 
FIGURE 2 
Open in figure viewerPowerPoint 
Categorization of security threats in IoMT edge network. 
5.1 Security threats to data confidentiality 
IoMT edge network consists of resource‐constrained IoT devices which deter the 
use of resource‐demanding cryptographic solutions (eg, data 
encryption/decryption) ensuring high level of data confidentiality, and thus making 
the network vulnerable to threats targeting the confidentiality of the exchanged or 
stored data.21 For example, an adversary can intercept exchanged information 
within the IoMT edge network through eavesdropping, by tracking 
communications and reading the contents of the transmitted packages.21 The 
adversary can passively intercept the communication between a wearable sensor, 
which wirelessly transmits patient's vitals to an IoMT gateway (eg, patient's 
smartphone), and extract confidential data (eg, through traffic analysis) in order to 
maliciously use them.42 Moreover, interrogation attacks, which might be 
considered as a type of impersonation, could compromise data 
confidentiality.20 More precisely, a malicious actor might pretend to be a legitimate 
entity, sending requests in other entities, with only purpose the exposure of private 
information about the users.43 
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5.2 Security threats to integrity 
A man‐in‐the‐middle (MitM) attack is a kind of attack that can jeopardize the 
integrity of IoMT edge networks, since the attacker interposes in the 
communication between the two parties and may modify the exchanged data 
without being noticed.21 For instance, the collected medical data of the IoMT edge 
network can be transmitted to a remote server or stored locally in the internal 
memory of the wearable devices. In case of transmission, a MitM attacker can 
intercept and modify the transmitted medical data compromising their 
integrity.22, 44, 45 Furthermore, the authors in Reference 22 refer to the malicious 
node injection attack as the most dangerous physical attack since it is not only 
interrupting the provided services but also modifying the stored data. 
Moreover, common attack types targeting to blunt the integrity of IoMT devices 
successfully include the physical attacks on the devices themselves.20 For instance, 
an adversary, who has physical access to an IoMT device, may change its structure 
so as to alter its behavior. Finally, the lack of lightweight malware detection 
mechanisms for IoMT devices allows attackers to compromise medical devices' 
integrity as well.20 For instance, an attacker can harm an IoMT device by executing 
a malicious code on it in and exploiting its security holes in networking software 
and hardware. 
5.3 Security threats to authentication 
Authentication is one of the essential security requirements of an IoMT‐based 
healthcare system. Because of the ubiquitous characteristics of the IoMT devices, 
the traditional PKI‐based authentication solutions are inefficient and 
nonexpandable.46 Moreover, adversaries aim at the poor authentication of a system 
in order to gain access to resources based on users' identity, without having 
genuine credentials.47 
The most common attacks directed at the authentication process are presented in 
References 45, 47-50. In forgery attacks, the first part of the attack aims at the 
counterfeit construction of identity, so that the malicious user can be authenticated. 
Afterward, the attacker transmits fake data in order to defraud other entities.48 
Furthermore, sybil attacks, where an IoMT device claims multiple fake identities, 
can be harmful by allowing rogue devices to impersonate other legitimate devices 
within the IoMT edge network. For instance, the rogue node can achieve to 
connect with several other IoMT devices in order to maximize its influence and 
even deceive the system to draw incorrect conclusions.50 In Reference 51, a 
taxonomy of sybil attacks in sensor networks is presented, where the attacks are 
categorized in three different categories: (i) communication of nodes, (ii) identity 
origin, and (iii) simultaneity. More precisely, the first category is distinguished in 
direct and indirect communication, characterized by the possibility of “sybil 
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devices” to communicate directly with legitimate devices or through a malicious 
device, respectively. The second category is analyzed in fabricated identities, 
where the adversary could pick random identities for the rogue devices, or stolen 
identities, when the malicious actor cannot insert new fake identities of devices in 
the system, resulting in stealing already existing legitimate identities. Finally, the 
third category is distinguished by the synchronous or asynchronous connection of 
sybil identities. An attacker might have the ability and the physical equipment to 
connect with multiple fake identities at once or he or she might choose to 
participate with a small number of sybil identities at a time, because of hardware or 
power constraints. 
Unlike sybil attacks, in device cloning/replication attack, each device has only one 
identity. In this type of attack, an adversary takes over a sensor device and extracts 
encrypted information, which is used in order to create a significant number of 
clones in the network and perform other attacks, compromising authentication and 
security objectives.52 This malicious action is succeeded when the authentication 
process does not include location‐based schemes, in order to banish devices 
located in the exact same location.51 
Finally, masquerading attacks may target IoMT edge networks as well. A 
masquerading attack can fall into one of the following two categories: either an 
adversary pretends to be a legitimate user in order to gain access to services that 
IoMT devices provide, via the insertion of rogue devices,20 or an attacker is 
allegedly presented as an IoMT device in order to offer fake services to users. The 
last case is hazardous in the healthcare sector, where the services provided by the 
IoMT devices are life‐dependent for a number of patients.48 
5.4 Security threats to authorization 
Adversaries may target poor authorization mechanisms of an IoMT edge network 
to achieve access to network resources without having the appropriate access 
rights. According to Reference 20, due to user's lack of security training and 
awareness, IoMT devices may be vulnerable to social engineering attack and thus, 
a malicious actor may trick the IoMT edge network and impersonate as legitimate 
in order to get access to user's medical devices. Regarding medical devices that 
oversee vital signs, this may endanger patient's life.53 
In addition, malware attacks may also compromise the connected IoMT devices by 
exploiting their inherent vulnerabilities, for example, weaknesses in authorization 
mechanisms. The infected IoMT devices can be used as bots to launch further 
attacks on other devices within the IoMT edge network and thus, the attacker can 
obtain access to the network services (eg, control of several IoMT device) or 
resources (eg, the collected medical data of a patient).20 
5.5 Security threats to availability 
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IoT technology is increasingly used in healthcare applications in order to 
overpower the disadvantages and limitations of the existing centralized cloud‐
based healthcare systems. However, the healthcare systems, where the existence of 
IoMT devices is dominant, are facing the constraints in resources and 
computational power,54 raising challenges in preserving the availability of the 
services provided. In fact, IoMT edge network can become very vulnerable to 
denial‐of‐service (DoS) attacks due its constrained resources. Various types of DoS 
attacks can be applied to different network layers and affect differently the IoMT 
edge network, such as tampering attacks, jamming attacks, battery drainage 
attacks, collision attack, congestion, and IoT‐botnet attacks.55 
More precisely, tampering is referred to as the alteration of transmitted data in such 
a way that IoMT edge network's operations are disrupted. In IoMT edge network 
environment, the hard detection of a tampering attack is due to the nature of poor 
and unsecure wireless connectivity.48 Moreover, jamming attacks are based on the 
enormous size of transmitted messages in order to overload the communication 
channels or the computing resources, so that IoMT devices are prevented from 
using the services provided normally.48 Jeopardizing the availability of an IoMT 
edge network, makes it immediately useless in providing real‐time healthcare 
services and may endanger patient's health. For instance, in an IoMT‐enabled 
healthcare alert system, if the communication channels within the IoMT edge 
network are jammed, the patient in critical condition may not receive the care 
he/she needs, and thus his/her lives may be at risk. The same result might be 
caused due to a battery drainage attack against an IoMT device that aims at the 
battery consumption of the resource‐constrained IoMT device.56 A battery drainage 
attack can be achieved by an adversary who maliciously sends fake or false 
messages to the target IoMT device.57 
Furthermore, in collision attacks, two nodes simultaneously transmit data on the 
same frequency channel, resulting in identification mismatch at the receiving end. 
This causes discard of the corrupted received data packets and retransmission of 
the same packets leading to waste of network resources within the IoMT edge 
network.58 In addition, channel congestion attack is achieved through the massive 
transmission of useless messages, causing high traffic in channels and making 
time‐related IoMT services and data unavailable.58, 59 
Finally, distributed denial of service attacks can also target the availability of the 
IoMT edge networks, where an attacker, through an IoT botnet, can flood the 
target device (eg, gateway) with multiple requests in order to overload them and 
disrupt the provided services. It is worthwhile to mention that the IoMT edge 
network is more vulnerable to DoS attacks compared with the Cloud platform in a 




6 SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES IN IoMT EDGE 
NETWORK 
In this section, we present a categorization of security countermeasures, derived 
from the literature, against the aforementioned threats to IoMT edge networks. The 
studied countermeasures are categorized based on the security objectives that they 
ensure within IoMT edge networks. 
6.1 Ensuring confidentiality 
Within the IoMT edge network environment, special care must be given to the 
management of data generated, stored, transmitted, and processed by the IoMT 
devices which are considered confidential. In order to protect data confidentiality 
in resource‐restricted IoMT devices, lightweight encryption protocols have been 
introduced by following the specifications presented in ISO/IEC 29192.60 There is 
a great amount of lightweight cryptographic schemes, such as symmetric key 
ciphers (ie, block and stream ciphers) and hash functions, which can establish 
secure communication between constrained IoMT devices, such as the medical 
sensors and nodes.48 Nevertheless, symmetric key ciphers suffer from the key 
distribution problem. For instance, fixed preconfigured keys in IoMT devices are 
vulnerable to compromise. Moreover, secret keys should be updated automatically, 
since many users, for example, elderly people are unable or unwilling to configure 
secure secret keys or update them frequently. In principle, shared keys should be 
generated with high agreement between the two communicating entities, high 
randomness, at a first rate, and with a minimum computational/energy 
overhead.48 Consequently, the generation of shared keys comprises a challenge for 
IoMT devices and several works have already been proposed to deal with it. 
Although symmetric key cryptography is more lightweight, ensuring privacy 
preservation for the resource‐constrained IoMT devices, there are still open issues 
in meeting the public key cryptography's requirements with the limitations of 
IoMT devices.61-63 For example, the level of complexity of the certificate path 
processing in a healthcare PKI infrastructure is one factor that affects the efficient 
adoption of PKI technology in healthcare networks.63 
6.2 Ensuring integrity 
In Reference 64, the authors present a combination of symmetric cryptography and 
attribute‐based encryption (ABE) in order to ensure the integrity of the transmitted 
data in the IoMT edge network environment. The transmitted messages are 
encrypted with a random symmetric key (RSK) which is encrypted with ABE. If 
an IoMT device has the correct secret key that satisfies the ABE access policy, 
then the RSK and the message are decrypted. The secret key is tagged with the 
device attributes set which represents the user's privileges. In this case, by 
legitimately changing the system configuration, there is the option of encrypting 
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the downloaded RSK, instead of the entire message, gaining in communication 
extent and encryption cost. 
On the other hand, another mechanism is elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which 
is used as a more lightweight, in terms of computational cost, cryptographic 
scheme for encrypting the public key, using smaller key size compare to the 
RSA.65 
It can further be deduced that almost all the communication protocols such as 
802.15.4, ZigBee and LoRaWAN provide conventional cryptographic security 
assurances such as data integrity. However, the cryptographic security embedded 
in communication protocols is not meant to protect against node compromise and 
malware attacks.20, 66 
Accordingly, apart from data integrity, software integrity is being considered a key 
element to guarantee security and privacy of the IoMT edge network.20 
6.3 Ensuring non‐repudiation 
When disputes come from an entity denying previous commitments or actions, a 
means to resolve this situation is essential. In IoMT devices, a commonly used 
means to handle these situations is access log where all the performed operations 
by/on them are stored securely. In other words, auditing ensures nonrepudiation in 
IoMT edge network environment. However, auditing should be complemented 
with appropriate mechanisms to detect and block attacks against nonrepudiation as 
well as with mechanisms (eg, encryption, access control) that will allow the 
prevention from occurring at first.67 
6.4 Ensuring authentication 
Authentication is a fundamental requirement for the security of IoMT. A great 
amount of authentication protocols and techniques exist, but the resource 
constraints of IoMT devices pose one key problem: the combination of 
heavyweight authentication techniques with their limited battery and computing 
power.47 Thus, a lot of effort should put on lightweight authentication mechanisms 
for IoT networks such as the IoMT edge networks.48, 49, 54, 68, 69 
For instance, an authentication technique which is recommended in 
Reference 70 is an improved certificate‐based DTLS handshake protocol, with 
three major changes: (i) prevalidating the certificates at the IoMT nodes in order to 
reduce the tasks executed in the constrained devices; (ii) forwarding resumptive 
sessions so as to decongest the transmission and the processing overhead; and (iii) 
delegating the handshake procedure for devices that cannot execute a certificate‐
based DTLS handshake, due to resource constraints, to the devices' owners. It is 
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worth mentioning that with the implementation of these modifications, the use of 
certificates appears to be less heavyweight. 
However, there is still carried out a lot of research about lightweight versions of 
authentication techniques suitable for IoT devices that can be also applied to IoMT 
devices. More precisely, in Reference 71, a lightweight mutual authentication 
scheme is proposed, between wearable or implantable sensors and a server, for 
wireless body area network. It is based only on hash function operations and XOR 
operations without using asymmetric key encryption. In this scheme, there is an 
access point, which acts as a gateway between the IoMT device and the server, 
forwarding messages to and from the IoMT device. According to Reference 71, the 
communication cost and computational time of the proposed scheme are similar to 
other lightweight authentication schemes,72, 73 but it is considered more secure 
against multiple type of attacks in IoMT edge networks such as eavesdropping, 
jamming, spoofing, replay attacks. 
Moreover, in Reference 74, the authors present an one time password (OTP) 
authentication scheme for IoT, based on asymmetric key encryption, using 
identity‐based ECC and Lamport's OTP algorithm. The proposed scheme is using a 
private key generator with smaller key size, which is resulting in a lightweight 
version, suitable for constrained devices such as the IoMT devices. 
Furthermore, another mechanism for mutual authentication between an IoT device 
and a server that can also be applied to IoMT edge networks is given in 
Reference 75. The proposed mechanism is based on challenge‐response 
mechanisms using physical unclonable functions that are unique, noninheritable, 
and nonreproducible physical characteristics of the IoT devices, just like 
fingerprints for the human beings. In particular, in this scheme, challenge‐response 
pairs are formed using the time‐based one‐time password algorithm mechanism. 
The presented protocol's key feature is the lack of secret information (ie, secret 
keys) that is stored in the IoT devices, which keeps the storage overhead very low. 
Based on the performance evaluation results described in Reference 75, the authors 
conclude that the proposed mechanism is not only secure against attacks to 
authentication, but also suitable for real‐time applications, such as healthcare 
services provided by resource‐constrained IoMT devices, because of their low 
computational and communication overhead. 
Besides, in Reference 76, a lightweight, privacy‐preserving authentication, and key 
agreement protocol, named PPAKA‐HMAC and an improved protocol, named 
PPAKA‐IBS are examined. The first one combines group key agreement with 
hash‐based message authentication code (HMAC) and pseudonym management for 
secure communications between the devices, and the second one uses identity‐
based signature (IBS) by contrast to PPAKA‐HMAC. The first one ensures secure 
communication and security against external malicious actors through a 
lightweight manner, but the second one provides resistance in internal malicious 
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actions. Both are thought to be suitable for mutual authentication of IoMT devices 
for real‐time IoMT edge networks. 
In addition, the authors in Reference 77 present a mutual authentication scheme for 
a proposed secure IoT‐based healthcare system using body sensor network (BSN) 
and called BSN‐Care. More specifically, in BSN‐Care system, sensors are 
connected to a local process unit (LPU) which sends and receives data to and from 
a BSN‐Care server. A lightweight anonymous authentication protocol is proposed, 
which can be applied to the verification process between the LPU and the server 
and also between the sensor nodes and the LPU. 
Concluding, it is worthwhile to mention that although a great number of 
authentication schemes for IoT devices have been proposed by researchers, a lot of 
effort should be put in the future in the design and development of authentication 
mechanisms suitable for the resource‐constrained IoMT devices. 
6.5 Ensuring authorization 
In principle, access control has been proven to be a reliable tool to ensure the 
authorization objective. In the case of the IoMT edge network, access control 
mechanisms may provide restricted access to the IoMT devices according to the 
requester's privileges where access control information is specified. Consequently, 
the level of access for each authorized requester can be controlled and thus 
reducing the risk of intrusion attacks. It is noteworthy to say that access control is 
also a method to achieve data confidentiality for the stored data on the IoMT 
devices.67 A good example of access control mechanisms is the access control lists 
(ACLs) which constitute an implementation of discretionary access control models 
based on the access matrix. The ACLs define the operations or data that an 
authenticated requester is authorized to execute or access, respectively. It is 
worthwhile to mention that such permissions are permanent once the ACLs are 
programmed.67 
In Reference 68, the authors proposed a meta fog‐redirection with grouping and 
choosing (GC) architecture to monitor patient's health status on a pervasive and 
ubiquitous basis through sensors on the body area network. Regarding this 
framework, GC architecture with key management scheme and data categorization 
function regarding the significance of the data (sensitive, critical, and normal) 
ensures that only authorized entities can obtain access to certain resources in IoT. 
Despite the efforts on access control mechanisms for ensuring authorization in IoT‐
based systems, there are still many open issues to address in order to develop 
robust access control mechanisms for heterogeneous resources in IoMT edge 
network environments.78 
6.6 Ensuring availability 
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Considering the criticality of the data in an IoMT edge network environment, the 
availability of the interconnected medical devices should be ensured. IoMT devices 
face limitations, as mentioned above, on resource and computational power.54 
Concerning jamming attacks, several research works have been focused on fully or 
partially centralized schemes and solutions.79-81 In addition, in Reference 82, a 
trigger identification service for defending reactive jammers is introduced. 
According to this scheme, nodes, whose transmission behavior is close to the 
jamming nodes' behavior, are identified and distinguished. Although, this scheme 
could successfully demolish the malicious actions, all the decisions made are 
cloud‐ or server‐based. In addition, the use of algorithms based on pattern 
recognition of the nodes' transmissions is a very promising solution, but the use of 
a centralized system is imperative in order to meet the computational cost.49 
In addition, strength of crowd (SOC) protocol is distributed and might be suitable 
for resource constrained IoMT devices. This protocol guarantees the delivery of 
messages to the receiving nodes, although a large proportion of the available 
bandwidth may be blocked. Specifically, SoC relies on deceiving the adversary, 
transmitting deception packets from legitimate devices to the network, confusing 
the jammer on which are the real ones.83 
Another type of attacks that need to be treated, in terms of availability, with 
particular care is the DoS attacks. Given the lightweight and low computational 
nature of IoMT devices, adversaries may manipulate them in order to overflood the 
communications and services of the edge network with a large number of request 
messages that may also result in the battery drain of the devices.84 A solution could 
be the adoption of a lightweight pattern/behavior recognition algorithm combined 
with a notification system, in order to detect abnormal activities.85 
It is worth mentioning that further research should be made in order to mitigate the 
threats that compromise the availability of the critical services provided by an 
IoMT edge network environment, moving toward the edge of the network and 
aiming at addressing the challenges due to the IoMT devices' constraints. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
IoMT edge networks aim to improve the patient's quality of life by enabling 
ubiquitous and personalized healthcare services such as a private healthcare 
provider round the clock. However, IoMT edge networks are vulnerable to various 
types of security threats and thus, they may pose a significant risk to patient's 
privacy and safety. Based on that and the fact that security is a critical factor highly 
dependent on the reliability of the involved IoMT devices, for the successful 
deployment of IoMT technology into pervasive healthcare systems, there is an 
urgent need for novel security mechanisms to preserve the security of the IoMT 
edge networks. Therefore, we first provided a categorization of existing and 
19 
 
potential threats to the IoMT edge network environment based on the following 
major security objectives that these threats target: confidentiality, integrity, 
nonrepudiation, authentication, authorization, and availability. In addition, we 
provided a categorization of security countermeasures, derived from the literature, 
against threats to IoMT edge networks. The objective of this work is twofold: (i) to 
give researchers a better understanding of the threats to the IoMT edge networks 
and the countermeasures against these threats, and (ii) to provide a foundation for 
organizing research efforts toward the design and development of proper 
lightweight security mechanisms overpowering the limitations of the IoMT 
devices, in terms of resources and computational power, and preserving the 
security in IoMT edge networks. 
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